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THE BRITISH PRESS AND THE MEXICAN WAR:
JUSTIN SMITH REVISED

WILLIAM H. MULLINS

I

1846 England was one of the great powers of the world; the
United States, although not on a scale with some of the European
countries, held the dominant position in the Western Hemisphere;
and Mexico, twenty-five yea~s after winning independence from
Spain, was still trying to establish itself as a stable 'nation. Except
for. a direct' attack on Great Britain, the actions of neither the
United States nor Mexico were really a threat to England. The
English government considered itself a friend of both countries,
although the,continued growth of the United States was a matter
of some concern. Indeed, it was in 1846 that the two countries
had settled the dispute over the Oregon Territory which could
have led to a serious conflict.
When the war between the United States and Mexico broke
out in May of that year, the British government officially assumed
a friendly, neutral stance; yet, at the same time, it cast a begrudging eye upon the obvious opportunity the United States had for
what many English believed to be aggrandizement. The English
government, then, ignored the conHictin America as much as possible; however, the ,var did seem to stir a certain amount of interest
among the infonned public of England.
.The first person to comment on this public reaction was Justin
Smith: In i914 Smith, who wrote the first complete history of
the war between Mexico and the United States, read a paper to
the Massachusetts Historical SoCiety entitled "Great Britain and
Our War of 1846~I848." In this paper, which was a preview of
a chapter in his book, he analyzed the attitudes of the English
N
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public toward the war, basing his conclusions upon his research
ip British newspapers and his· own broad knowledge of the conflitt. As one reads Smith's comments sixty years later, it appears
that, especially in regard to the British, he Was all too much a
captive of.his times. The purpose of this study, then, is to take a
fresh look at the subject, reevaluate the evidence Smith used, and
then come to some conclusions about the merits and shortcomings
of the earlier work.
First it is necessary to set the stage by briefly examining the
official and unofficial policies the British government pursued
during the conflict between the United States and Mexico. On
May 13, 1846, the United States declared war on Mexico. Secretary of State James Buchanan immediately sent a dispatch to
Louis McLane, the American minister in .England, telling him
of the war. Buchanan instructed McLane to inform Foreign Secretary Lord Aberdeen that hostilities had commenced, that the objective of the United States was to conquer a lasting peace, and that
Mexico would be blockaded to hasten such a peace. 1
The two men who occupied the British Foreign Office during
the two years of war were very different individuals, who followed
quite different poliCies. Lord Aberdeen held the position for less
than two months after Zachary Taylor crossed the Rio Grande.
He was regarded by Americaris and English alike as a pursuer of
peace who was agreeable to compromises and approaches which
would lead to such a goal. Lord Palmerston, the man who con~
trolled British foreign affairs for the majority of thetwoyears,had
a reputation for aggressiveness and taking a hard line. Certainly
George Bancroft, who replaced McLane as minister to England in
the latterpartof 1846, neither liked nor trusted him. 2
McLane and Bancroft were concerned not only about the attitudes of the official policy makers, but also about English public
opinion. Immediately after news of the war became public, British
opinion seemed to be, at least to McLane's mirid,overwhelmingly
against the United States. According to McLane, many were concerned about the increased power that an American victory would
bring to the United States; A belief which gained some currency
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in Britain was that the preparations being made, ostensibly for the
conflict with Mexico, were in reality for a war with; Great Britain.
In lightof this the American minister pleaded with his government
fora swift conclusion to the war. 3 Aberdeen; however,persuaded
McLane that the government was not going to assume a militant
stand, and showed the worried minister an earlier note to Mexico
warning that England would remain neutral if hostilities broke
out~

Astime went on and Bancroft replaced McLane, the American
minister's reports on British policy grew more sanguine. Although
he still detected indications of English bluster from time to time,
Bancroft reported that the British would even permit the annexationof Mexico~a sentiment, echoed by Palmerston himself.4 In
a typical statement, Bancroft,who never could be accused of underestimating the greatriessof the United States,wIote to Buchanan:
~ : . through· the clouds of angry words and feelings, public· andprivate, the conviction is constantly becoming deeper and deeper, that
it is.in vain for European Powers to attempt to arrest or check the
prosperity of our country.5.

Indeed, by the end of the war, both the English leaders and the
publiC werecongnitulatirig the United States on its successes,and
Bancroft still believed an annexation of Mexico would be sanc~
tioned;6
In Parliament, debate in the House of Commons turned to the
war on only two occasions, both times early in the course of the
conflict. In late June 1846 Prime Minister RobertPeel explained
the government's position; but in August.Lord George Bentinck
and Benjamin Disraeli made speeches which must have made
Americans uneasy. Lord George reminded the House that private
interests in Great Britain had important investments in Mexico
which wer~ being imperiled by the war. Moreover, he continued,
the United States was set upon a war ofaggressive conquest, which
could possibly lead to an attempt to seize British possessions in the
T
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join with several other countries to govern Mexico as a protectorate
and to create a strong, free, nation. s Two other members who joined
the debate counseled greater moderation and a course of non..
interference in a matter they considered of no critical importance.
From general public and semiofficial reaction to the war, it
seemed possible that the government of Great Britain might
strongly and formally encourage America to make an early peace.
The actual policy was simple but firm. Aberdeen, when McLane
informed him of the outbreak of hostilities, immediately made an
unofficial offer of mediation to the American minister. This was
eventually conveyed to Washington where it was ignored by the
United States. Palmerston made a second, official offer of mediationtoboth countries shortly thereafter and this was rejected by
both belligerents. Also, a precautionary defensive step of making
a shipment of arms to Canada was taken. The government of
Great Britain, then, was able to ignore the whole matter officially
while standing ready as a mutual friend to work out a suitable
peace.
Several problems arose out of, or were affected by, the war.
Because the Oregon dispute, which was a definite threat to friendly
Anglo-American relations, had not been fully settled by the time
the war began, it was a matter of immediate and considerable
concern. McLane, in fact, accused Aberdeen of urging the Mexi~
cans to war in order to pressure America into accepting an Oregon
settlement favorable to the British. Although the Foreign Secretary
denied this, it is likely that the approach of war, combined with
his conciliatory attitude on the Oregon question, did lead to an
early settlement. 9 Disraeli, however, was unsatisfied and warned
that with the acquisition of Oregon and Texas the United States
was taking steps toward surrounding and ultimately seizing a great
deal of Mexico?O
. California was another territory which might have led to trouble
between the United States and Great Britain during the war.
When the Hudson's Bay Company, long before the war, advised
its' government to take possession of the area as a colony, the suggestion was turned down. An unofficial offer by the Mexican agent
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in London to sell. California to Great Britain, after the territory
had been lost, met the same fate. Bancroft correctly analyzed the
position of the English when he wrote informally to President
Polk;that Great Britain did not have any love for the United
States, but the British government was reluctantly forced by its
respect for America to remain neutral in regard to California. l1
Palmerstonalso skillfully handled two issues which grew out of
the war itself. Rumors that an agent of Mexico was issuing letters
of marque in England elicited a question in Parliament about the
legality of such actions. Palmerston assured the questioner that
upon request of the Queen the Foreign Enlistment Act would be
invoked against anyone soliciting for privateers. 12 Although the
report about the Mexican agent was false, Palmerston's response
was undoubtedly reassuring to the United States. Another incident
relating to the war was also handled. to the satisfaction of the
American government. In August 1847 the mail steamer T eviot,
which·as a mail ship was allowed togo through the U.S. blockade
to Mexico, brought to Vera Cruz General Mariano Paredes, the
former Mexican President. The United States government claimed
that because a ship captain should be:responsible for his passengers, Captain May of the T eviot was grossly negligent in permitting Paredes to return to Mexico. The United States protested,
asking that some action be taken again the captain. Palmerston
turned the matter over to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company
which suspended May.
Although 'England held itself aloof from the war and acquiesced
in the tremendous territorial expansion which resulted from the
American victory, it is probable that an alteration in the AngloAmerican power relationship was an outcome of the war. By permitting the·United States to absorb the Oregon, California, and
New Mexico territories the British were giving up any hope of
establishing or supporting a power in the Western Hemisphere
strong enough to be a balance to the United States. 13 England, of
course, still held a strong position anywhere in the world ,through
its sea power, and Palmerston consoled· himself· in the accurate
belief that the United States was headed toward division partly

212

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW LII:3 1977

due to its eXpansion. Fortunately for the United States England
did not aid or encourage Mexico; nor did the British take ad·
vantage of America, especially on the Oregon question, during
the war. Indeed, both Aberdeen and Palmerston seemed almost resigned to continued territorial eXpansion of the United States.
With this background, we can now turn to the reaction of the
British public to the war, and then proceed to critique Justin
Srnith's evaluation of these sentiments. Although newspapers
could not be considered a totally accurate gauge of public opinion,
it is stilI valuable to analyze and compare the position of several
contemporary publications in order to understand what attitude
many of the informed public had toward the war on the other
side of the Atlantic. It is possible, moreover, to gain a greater
insight into Smith'spresentation by examining newspapers, since
he used them as virtually his only source.
Even though response to the war between the two American
neighbors bordered on disinterest at the official level, this was
hardly indicative of the reaction of several leading newspapers
and periodicals of the time. All of the publications included in
this study presented not only a great deal of news from the battlefields, but also considerable advice and comment on the justification, prosecution, and results of the war.
Possibly the most important newspaper in the world in the
mid-nineteenth century was the Times of London. With correspondents in every part of the world, the Times's peerless international coverage was thorough. The amount of news about the war
between the United States and Mexico and the quantity of commenton the war far surpassed that of any other paper in England;
The Times was considered to be ct • •• on the side of the more liberal
conservatives" before the 1848 revolutions. 14 The editor of the
paper, in part for personal reasons, was a supporter of Aberdeen in
almost everything he did. Because the London paper objected
to the Corn Laws, however, it was not friendly to any other part
of Robert Peel's government. On the other hand, the Times
frequently quarreled with the succeeding government of Lord
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John Russell, especially attacking Palmerston. The anti-American
and rather antidemocratic views of this newspaper almost always
overrode any other consideration when it editorialized on the war.
To provide a balance, several other sources of editorial commenthave been examined. The Manchester Guardian, aimed at
the cotton manufacturers at Lancashire and influenced by:the
commercial contact between Liverpool and the New World, was
one of the important newspapers published outside London: The
Guardian advocated the franchise for the middle class (but not
lower classes) and a laissez faire economy.15
The -Examiner, a London Sunday paper, and The lllustrated
LondonNews were two publications which presented both hard
news and an abundant number of feature articles, and thus fall
between the classificatIon of newspaper and periodical magazine.
Both were reform-minded, calling for better treatment of the poor,
factory legislation, and reforms in the parliament, the army, and
prisons. 16 A conservative, loyalist Canadian newspaper, (Canada,
of course, was still.acolony at the time), the Montreal Gazette,
adds to the balance of opinion, by providing an unmistakably
English point of view fromthe New World. Two periodical essays
from the Westminster Review and Tait's Edinburgh Review round
out the sources examined. As we shall see, the opinion of the
English newspapers an,d periodicals in regard to the war possessed
a: great degree of unanimity, despite their diverse attitude on domestic matters.
All of the daily or weekly publications had basiCally the same
format for presenting War news and views. As ships arrived from
America, the United States newspapers were searched for significant news. The papers would then print this in a column entitled
"United States" or ''The War between the United States and
Mexico," which would usually be headed with a short paragraph
informing the reader upon what ship the information had arrived
and whether the .news was interesting or not (it ~was usually
deemed uninteresting). The news was, presented in the form of
long excerpts from American papers, important messages and
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speeches, or a well pieced together summary of several newspaper
reports. Editorial comment and the hard news were very rarely
mixedtogether.
The Times, with its correspondents, was able to add to this
second hand information. A regular reporter was in Mexico writing
and commenting about conditions in that country. In the United
States the Times had two contributors. The regular correspondent
reported infrequently; but an American citizen, who signed his
regular reportorial letters to the paper "A Genevese Traveller,"
contributed his usually Anglophilic impressions of his country.
At the beginning of the war, a great deal of news about the conRict filled the pages of the papers; but as it progressed slowly with
long lulls, the news became at times rather sparse. Then, with
the outbreak of the rash of revolutions in Europe in 1848, news
of the end of the farther removed war all but disappeared. Even
the Montreal Gazette failed to report the final ratification of the
treaty between the United States and Mexico.
For the most part, each paper restricted its judgments and comments to the editorial columns. Only the Times, whose .correspondents regularly mixed fact and opinion, permitted comment on
the news to escape its editorial page. Also, a few readers contributed
letters stating their views on the war on the North American continent. Although the factual reporting is important in the sense
that its quantity might be indicative of the concern each publication showed for the war (e.g., the tapering off of news at the
onset of the 1848 revolutions); it is the editorial opinion which
is critical for this study. It is this comment which at times must
have. helped shape, and at other times reRected, the opinions of
the readers of the newspaper. It is possible, then, to begin to get
at what public opinion there was in Great Britain concerning the
war between Mexico and the United States by examining newspaper editorials.
Before the outbreak of the war, the settlement of the Oregon
dispute was the subject which filled the "United States" columns
and which was granted editorial space in English newspapers. The
Guardian and the Examiner advised Aberdeen not to weaken to
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the war party of Polk, which was trying to make political capital
out.of the issue. They recommended such a course even if it meant
plunging Great Britain into a war with the United States.17 In
April reports of a possible conflict between Mexico and the United
States began to appear. As these predictions grew into reports of
actual fighting, the Oregon issue was still the foremost concern
in England; The Times called for a speedy finalization of the
Oregon- question while the war, which then seemed to be destined
fora swift completion, occupied America's attention. There was
a concern that after the war the United States would undoubtedly
be. more bellicose than ever, this time toward Great Britain. 1S
Understandably, then, English newspapers viewed the conflict
in its. early stages mainly in terms of its effect on the Oregon
question.
In all wars it seems to be the duty of those who report it, if they
are to do a complete job, to evaluate the causes of the conflict imd
sometimes place the guilt for the. war. .The English newspapers
were by no means derelict in this duty. Almost unanimously the
publications condemned the United States as the aggressor. All
five papers responded to President Polk's war message. These
journals rejected Polk's contention that the Mexican government
was at fault because it refused to negotiate with Minister John
Slidell and because Mexican troops attacked an American patrol.
Instead, the British press accused the United States of intention~
ally precipitating. the war by sending Zachary Taylor across· the
Nueces River into the disputed boundary of Texas. The Examiner, the Gazette, and the Times all soon correctly discerned that
a major American objective was California. The latter paper
pointed to instructions issued in 1845 to the American Pacific
Commander to occupy Pacific ports in case of war. 19 Needless to
say, this reconfirmed the belief that Polk and the "war party" were
acting from purely acquisitive motives. Nowhere in the papers
could a reader discover any hint that Mexico might in some way
be blamed for the war. The only attitude which was anything less
than accusation of the United States was the belief that because
America was so strong and Mexico so weak a war was inevitable.
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In accord with this idea a reviewer for the Westminster Review
maintained that the -United States could bring some order out of
chaos by conquering its weaker neighbor. 20
Even though the newspapers seemed to be primarily interested
in battlefield strategy and in the internal affairs of the two countries, they all were aware of the effects of the War on England.
The offers of mediation, which Aberdeen and Palmerston presented, were, of course, praised, but the Guardian and Examiner
correctly predicted thatboth countries, certainly the United States,
would reject the offers. 21 While the Montreal Gazette, early in
the war, believed that neither England nor France would permit
the United Statesto invade Mexico; the other newspapers took a
less concerned outlook, but assured their readers that Great Britain
would react if threatened and, indeed, had increased the size of
its fleet in the West Indies. 22
Probably the greatest immediate impact of the war on Great
Britain was economic, and the papers were well aware of the commercial effect. Although Lord George Bentinck's concern for private investors in Mexico was not reflected in the newspapers, trade
was a special point of consideration. The Times claimed that the
blockade of Mexico was having an especially adverse effect on
the port of Liverpool. A letter writer reported that no one would
unload Mexican ships, fearing a "war risk."23 Mexican bond
holders were also obviously upset at the war.
Mexican privateering, which was a potential threat to American
shipping, was a genuine concern for British commercial interests.
In fact, shipping insurance rates rose for a short period at the beginning of the war in response to a fear for the safety of American
vessels. The unsettling report that a Mexican agent was issuing
letters of marque stemmed entirely from articles in the Times. On
January 8, 1847, the Times announced that for the first time in
forty years authorization for privateering was being offered in
England. Five days later an editorial in the same paper condemned
this "barbaric custom." In the same issue a letter also poured out
_vituperation on the practice of privateering. This minor controversy
subsided quickly when on January 15 Frederic Bernes, a gunshop
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owner, explained in a letter to the Times that he had merely advertised that a genuine Mexican letter of marque wason display
but none were being issued. 24
A more substantial subject of. concern to the Times was the
forced loans which the Mexican government was attempting to
extract from British citizens living in Mexico. The Times protested 'notagainst the call for loans, but against the fact that a disproportionately large amount was sought from British residents.
~ccordingly, the London newspaper readily backed Lord Palmerston in his protest to the Mexican government. 25 Jt must have been
gratifying, then, to Bancroft or any other American observer of
English opinion, to see especially the Times take these positions
which, if not exactly pro-American, were at least not at all sympathetic to Mexico.
A special bright spot that appeared among the castigations which
the Times usually directed toward ApIerica during the war was
the newspaper's overall attitude toward the prospect of the United
States controlling Mexico, and how such' a takeover would affect
British interests. Even though the Times railed against what it
termed American aggression, the paper, echoing the opinion first
put forth in the: Westminster Review, advised England not to
waste time defending the Mexicin government, since domination
by the United States would create a much more settled, orderly
country. The frequent revolutions would come to an end, property
would be better protected, agricultural production would increase,
and the level of civilization would rise. As a result of this, the
Times editorialized, Great Britain's commercial interests would
be greatly enhanced. It was wise, therefore, topennit a conquest
by the United States. 26
In regard to other phases of the war, however, the Times and
other papers displayed a considerably less favorable attitude toward
the United States. All the newspapers held' the American army
in particularly low esteem. The Guardian believed few would
volunteer for the army, 'considering the health hazards' and poorly
organized supplysystem. 27 The fact that the army was composed
primarily of volunteers was' a' source of constant criticism from
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all the papers.. An ill-trained volunteer army, made up ofa hodgepodge of nationalities, could never hope to be effective, they
claimed. From time to time reports of drunkenness, brutality, and
misconduct appeared in papers. 28 The Times seemed especially
concerned that Americans would plunder the gold and silver
riches of the Mexican churches. 29 The commanders of the American army and their strategy were also targets of a good deal of
comment. The Examiner described Zachary Taylor as unimagina~
tive and reluctant to place his successful record in jeopardy by
making an attack on Mexican forces. The Times questioned Winfield Scott's strategy of stopping and starting on his way to Mexico
City.sO This newspaper also remained unimpressed by the crucial
American victories at Buena Vista and Vera Cruz. Explaining that,
even though beaten at Buena Vista, the Mexicans could still relax
on the wide plateau which· composed most of Mexico, and horrified by the bombarding of the city of Vera Cruz, the Times
could see little good in the American successes. S ! The Guardian,
however, said the two victories proved conclusively that American
forces were superior. As the war ground to an end the Times
finally concurred. s2
The Mexican army, however, fared even worse in the pages of
English newspapers. The American triumphs were analyzed in
terms of Mexico's weaknesses. To the Times both armies displayed
the poverty of character of the New World. An underlying theme
in many articles of other papers was the natural supremacy of an
Anglo-Saxon race over descendants of .the Spanish. This was
especially true of a writer in the Westminster Review who·believed the Mexicans were simply less civilized and unsurprisingly
cowardly.33 In light of all this, the newspapers took it upon themselves to offer the underdogs some advice. Especially the Guardian,
but most. of the other papers, implored the Mexican General
Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna to turn to guerrilla warfare as
an effective means of combating the Americans' overwhelming
strength. The Manchester publication and others pointed out that
it would be next to impossible to defeat a scattered, mobile army
in the vast unhealthful land of Mexico. 34 It is clear that in the
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estimation of English newspapers both armies were far inferior to
those of Europe, especially the British military forces.
Along with analyzing ,and advising the two armies, English
publications gave considerable attention, to the governments of
the opposing nations. Although most of the comments were directed toward 'the United States, the rather fluid situation at
Mexico City was given some space. As noted before, the unstable
Mexican government was an object of disgust. The British press
reported Mexican rulers to be at best ineffective and at worst
despots. They reviled a congress racked with intrigue and wrote
with growing consternation about each revolution. 35 The newspapers offered advice to the government, telling the Mexicans that
their fight against the United States was hopeless and that they
should begin to treat for peace immediately. The Times was especially offended at the prospect of such a weak government refusing to give in and begin negotiations to conclude the war.36
,The Mexican government, as a weak system almost incapable
of functioning at all, may have been beneath contempt; but the
United States could not fall to quite so Iowa leveL Indeed; a great
part of the editorial space the newspapers gave to the war between
Mexico and the United States was devoted to heaping c0ntempt
upon the American government. The Guardian and the Times
explicitly spoke out against democracy as a definite evil and a
vulgar form of government which led to war and internal chaos. 37
The newspapers believed President James K. Polk led a war
party which was seeking a conflict with another nation to gain
'popularity. The papers warned that this party not only had pushed
the United States into war with Mexico, but also had a strong
streak of Anglophobia which- potentially could create a conflict
with Great Britain. 3s .
A~ leader of' this party, Polk especially was held in disrepute
by the British press. He was called the "Napoleon of the backwoods," and piclured as ". . . the unscrupulous ruler of a democratic state confidently appealing to the passions of the populace."39
The reaction' to' the .President's major speeches was especially
scornful. Bancroft noted that the papers sent up a "growl" in
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response to the war message. 40 Later they claimed Polk blundered
into war with neither plan nor policy, and, as the war dragged on,
he was reaping his reward. 41 Although the Examiner actually
praised one of Polk's speeches as being temperate, his subsequent
messages were greeted primarily with derision. Despising as futile
his attempts at explaining the war, the Times said, "He has laid
it on so thick as to form an expugnable edifice"; and The Illustrated
London News termed the speech "bombastic."42 As the 1848
presidential election neared, the Examiner and especially the
Times took great pleasure in predicting Polk's political demise.
Taking an I~told-you-so attitude, the papers proclaimed that
waging war was an unsuccessful method of gaining votes. 43
British newspapers recorded the strong antiwar sentiment in
the United States with obvious satisfaction. Again and again each
paper announced which groups had become war weary. The
Times's Genevese Traveller described the country as gloomy as
the war continued much longer than expected; as early as November 1846 the Montreal Gazette announced that Americans
were tiring of war; an antiwar feeling was reported to be growing
in Congress; and in early 1849 the Times believed the administration itself hated the continuing war. When the United States
smuggled Santa Anna into Mexico, it was taken as a sign that the
American government was eager for a new Mexican government
with which it could negotiate a peace treaty.44
The primary vexation which plagued the American government
was the cost of the war. Very early in the conflict every one of the
newspapers correctly predicted it would be extremely expensive,
and on financial grounds alone the United States administration
would regret its decision to go to war. Of course, as the war continued, the publications noted the debates in Congress over further
spending. In an age which believed deficit spending was a wrong
which placed an unfair burden on posterity, the English journals
were interested to see how America would finance the war, and
commented ominously when Congress continued to appropriate
funds. 45 By the end of the war the Times and Guardian fully
expected America to plunder Mexico to recoup at least part of
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the expenditure. 46 Thus, English public opinion, at least as reRected in several newspapers, held neither the Mexican nor the
American government in high regard. The government of Mexico
was scorned for its instability and weakness; while the United
States was condemned by many for its democracy, its aggression,
and almost surely because it was a nation which waS becoming
steadily more powerful and which some day would probably be
a viable rival of Great Britain.
It was clear that the United States was by far the stronger of
the two belligerents, and that it was merely a matter of time before
the stronger would prevail. The capture of Mexico City by Scott's
forces in September 1847 signaled the military end of the war.
MexiCo, however, by its very weakness was able to thwart the
compretion of an American victory and prolonged the war several
months. There was no government which possessed sufficient
strength to negotiate with the Americans. Any group that dared
to sign a peace treaty would be' overthrown immediately by its
rivals. From the newspapers of Great Britain came more ridicule
than sympathy for America's dilemma. Not only did this further
substantiate their appraisal of the Mexican government, but it also
was treated as something which would teach the United States
another lesson. The Times, which declared the United States
to be winners yet still losers, compared fully defeating Mexico with
trying to crash into a comet which has no substantial nucleus. 47
Finally, the newspapers began to speculate on the possibilities
of peace. In April 1847 Polk had sent Nicholas Trist; a high
ranking clerk in the State Depar'tment, to· handle negotiations
with the Mexican government. It was not until the autumn of
that year, after the occupation of Mexico City, that any British
paper was prepared to believe a treaty could be concluded. The
Genevese Traveller, after months of declaring that there was no
peace in sight, finally infonned the Times in October 1847 that
the war might come to an end soon. 48 Most papers perceived that
the United States did not carefor all of Mexico; but wanted only
the disputed Texas land, California, New Mexico, and perhaps
the southern isthinus fOr a canal. The Guardian believed the
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Americans would not care to deal with the problems entailed by
absorbing more than that, while the Examiner advised Polk to be
satisfied with the area from San Francisco Bay north. 49 In March
1848, with the entire world preoccupied with the revolutions of
that year, the United States and Mexico ratified a peace treaty.
To all of this castigation and criticism which the British press
heaped upon the United States, Justin Smith reacted perhaps
typically for someone writing in the early twentieth century. The
first several paragraphs of Smith's paper provide the reader with
strong clues to his attitudes. He first reviews brieRy the sore points
in Anglo-American relations, beginning with the Revolution and
concluding with the disagreement over Texas before the United
Stites annexed it. It is clear that Smith was a fairly strong Anglophobe. As such, Smith was too easily and too greatly offended by
the anti-Americanism displayed by the British newspapers and
was unable to put their comments on the war into proper perspective.
Smith, moreover, held Mexico in very low esteem. In The War
with Mexico, his major work on the war, Smith characterizes Mexicans as a race inferior to Anglo-Saxons (a viewpoint which may
have been confirmed in his mind by the confused conditions in
Mexico at the time of his writing). He also goes to great lengths
to place the entire burden of guilt for the war upon Mexico. Such
an attitude seems to inRuence his earlier article.
. First of all, he puts too much responsibility on England and
the newspapers for encouraging the war. In his desire to place the
blame on the Mexicans, Smith paints them as "born gamblers"
who cOilld be led into war by the faintest hopes of victory. It is
Smith's opinion that the prospect of war between England and the
United States over Oregon proffered such a hope. 50 Certainly a
conRict between these two would have· been encouraging to
Mexico.· As Smith expands this po'int in The War with Mexico,
he claims that the Mexican government actually pinned their hopes
not merely on a war, but on an ~glo-Mexican alliance. 51 By May
1846, however, Aberdeen had informed the Mexican h~aders
that suchan alliance could never come about. The bravado of the
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most foolhardy gambler would have been subdued, rather than
fired, by England's official attitude. It is unlikely that England's
official pOlicy tipped the scale for war.
Smith also asserts that the deprecations of the American government in the English newspapers encouraged the Mexicans to
fight. As we haveseen,it is true that before the war many English
papers had doubts about American determination, ability, and
strength; and expressed beliefs that a fulL conquest of Mexico
could be a formidable undertaking. 52 It is unlikely, however, that
the influence that British journals had in Mexico could compare
with the more substantial causes of the war-the reluctance of a
weak Mexican government to treat with John Slidell; the unwillingness of Mexico to accede to a more powerful nation in what
it believed to be excessive demands; or the presence of Zachary
Taylor in the'disputed territory.
.
Smith summarizes his other findings in four points:
... it seems to be clear that our succeeding in a war with Mexico
was by rio means considered in England a matter of course, as we
have'been accustomed. to regard it; that our achievements produced
a state of mind respecting us very different from that which had prevailed before; and that our terms of peace,instead of appearing extortionate were viewed as disappointingly moderate. It appears evident
also that the British were disposed to welcome any safe opportunity
.
for interfering.53

His first point suffers from his own misapprehension of the inevitability of American victory. Throughout much of the war
various problems which the English press pointed ouf-the vastness
of the land of Mexico, its unhealthful climate, the problems of
American finance, and the lack of full domestic support in the
United States-were all .very real hindrances to victory and were
perceived by Americans. For many. in the United States our succeeding in a war with Mexico, or atleast our desire to succeed in
such .aventure, was not a matter of course. Smith's conclusion
thiltB'ritisli newspapers questioned America's fortitude is correct;
however,' they were being more' factual andiealistic than he is
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willing to admit. He seems to regard these analyses, which were
overstated at times, as unjust criticisms of America, primarily because they came from England.
Smith's second point about British attitudes toward America
contains some validity, but is also stretched. He relies on a quotation from Bancroft, who was as much an Anglophobe as was
Smith; to· prove that a considerable change of attitude toward
AmeriCa had occurred in· England after the war.54 It seems clear,
however, that the British government, including Palmerston, had
already conceded prior to the war that the United States was the
unquestioned power of the Western Hemisphere, and this was
one reason why Great Britain was unwilling to interfere~ A more
rigorous or fairer examination of newspapers, however, would
have revealed that for years after the war the Times was still neither
friendly towards nor respectful of the democratic United States,
and that in other newspapers only the estimation of the quality
of an American volunteer army was significantly altered by the
war.
British "disappointment" that the United States did not annex
all of Mexico, which is Smith's third point, was not as widespread
as he would have us believe.55 Surely, the Times could see an
ultimate commercial :tdvantage in the United States acquiring
Mexico; but perhaps even this was a rationalization for the British
government's policy of nonintervention. It is true that other newspapers seemed resigned to annexation; however, as pointed out
before, a majority of the papers analyzed in this study advised
against taking the whole of Mexico. Although many in England
were aware of the possibility that the United States could absorb
all of Mexico, they were hardly disappointed when this did not
come about.
.
Finally, Smith sees any effort by Great Britain to intenvene in
the war in any way as unnecessary meddling. He incorrectly states
the British believed a war against the United States would "impoverish Mexico, make her less valuable as a customer (to Great
Britain), and reduce her ability to pay English bondholders."56
This, of course, flies in the face of the Times's and other com-
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mentators'beliefs that annexation by the United States might bea
commercial good. Moreover, it seems that Smith protests too much
over England's two rather forceless offers t() mediate. After all, even
before the war, Abe~deen warned the Mexican government that
England would not come toher aid.
Although Smith made some points that could have been considered partially valid, he grossly overstated them as he took great
umbrage at the verbal slaps of the English press. It is true that
all the British newspapers examined in this study, especially the
Times, were not particularly amicable toward the United States
or anything it did. It does seem that even though they were unanimous in their contempt for the American government, and, to a
lesser extent, .for the American army, these publications held a
certain deep-lying respect for the United States'as a growingpower.
It was a nation much stronger and more capable than Mexico (or
any otheination in the· New World) and .one which. the newspapers obviously rated well below England. But at the same time
the English saw the United States as an expanding threat, even
to their own country. A strong Anglophobe, Justin Smith failed
to detect this respect-even fear-of what might someday be. As
a result his analysis of British attitudes is neither adequately penetrating, nor sufficiently objective.
.
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St. Vincent Sanatorium, built as an industrial school and later used as an
orphanage. It burned inJuly 185)6. Photo courtesy of the Archives of the
Sisters of Charity, Mt. St. Joseph, Ohio.

